

Presented by



Ken Gamble IFW Global Chairman



Operation Tropicana Malaysia, Feb 2023





Unmasking Fraud, Corruption & Money Laundering Managing Risks in the Digital Age

> 3 June 2025 Amora Hotel, Sydney



FINANCIAL CRIMES

WHO IS IFW GLOBAT

IFW

CRI

Ken Gamble

Executive Chairman

Location-NSW,Australia

18 years with IFW Global

Ken is a front-line cybercrime investigator with extensive qualifications and experience in investigation, intelligence, surveillance and asset recovery, developed over a 37-year career. Ken has consulted to various foreign governments and law enforcement agencies and presented on cybercrime topics at Interpol events. Ken has received 4 law enforcement awards

Allan Watson

Director of Global Investigations

Location-United Kingdom

18 years with IFW Global

Allan Watson has 40 years' experience in varying fields of investigations. These include serious investment fraud, asset tracing and recovery, business intelligence and security and crisis management in both the corporate and government sectors. Allan is presently in charge of coordinating complex investigations in many continents across the world including Asia, Europe, Africa, Middle East and the Americas.





Background of Operation Tropicana

- Landmark transnational investigation exposing a \$1 billion investment scam run from secret call centres in Malaysia
- Led by IFW Global in collaboration with the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) in a private-public partnership
- Over 80 suspects arrested across 24 simultaneous raids in Kuala Lumpur and Johor (Penang)
- Sophisticated fraud network targeting global victims with fake IPOs and share investments
- Complex laundering of criminal proceeds through banks in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore
- Infiltration by IFW operatives provided covert intelligence to dismantle the network
- Major breakthrough in targeting "professional enablers" within financial institutions







THE IPO SCAM

- ASM Pacific Technology
- **Space X IPO**
- **Energy Australia**
- **Porsche IPO**
- Starlink IPO
- Apple
- **Hyper Vision Limited**
- Xiaomi IPO
- Tesla
- Novacure



 The scammers heavily promoted IPOs on Australian social media platforms. An IPO is the process of offering shares of a private corporation to the public in a new stock issuance for the first time.

The fraudsters used IPOs of real companies


Rivian Automotive Electric Vehicles

Virtual companies operating slick websites from Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong promoting real IPOs

* Agard Union Trading * Aspen Asset Management * Lincoln Management Group * Charrington Pacific Group * Cullman Mutual Capital * Kingsman Investments * Tochigi Mutual Capital * Chiba Taiko Partners * Suncap Advisors * Whiteoak Capital









Scams promoted worldwide on self publishing newswire websites

NEWS PROVIDED BY DELETE April 01, 2021, 11:33 GMT

Charrington Pacific Group, has announced today the launch of a new digital wealth management platform for its workforce.

TOKYO, JAPAN, April 1, 2021 /EINPresswire.com/ -- Charrington Pacific Group's platform is designed to power a modern wealth management business – including functionality to streamline internal processes. Features include proposal generation, paperless onboarding, risk-questionnaires, model management software, client portfolio monitoring and rebalancing tools, fee billing, compliance tools and a client portal.

Charrington Pacific Group Announces Implementation of New Technology Platform

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Charrington Pacific Group Announces Implementation of New Technology Platform

The Money Laundering





• After victims agreed to "invest", they were directed to make wire transfers to bank accounts that they were told were "escrow accounts" held by "Transfer Agents" in, among other places: Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, UAE and Indonesia.

• These "escrow accounts" were held by shell companies created by the suspects to further the investment fraud scheme and launder the proceeds.



The Protection Racket

- ulletPolice
 - titles



IFW operatives uncovered a KL based security company protecting the fraud group

The security company was owned by former high-ranking members of the Royal Malaysia

A middleman named Mr. "K" was the "go-between" and "Enforcer" paying USD50K a month for protection

The Enforcer & Protector

- **Permal Kunder A/L KARUPAN** leased residential apartments on behalf of Boiler Room Foreign workers to reside in whilst in Malaysia.
- Many of these were Filipino workers, trafficked into Malaysia under false employment letters.
- The workers passports were confiscated once they were in Malaysia and held by management as "security" over the workers
- Workers were told the operation was protected by Police and AMANATS Security and anyone who leaked information would be dealt with harshly






The Sources

- IFW recruits a source who was previously employed in the boiler room to provide details of the office locations and floor layout
- IFW operatives' recruit a second source to work in the boiler room undercover to gather evidence and intelligence on the group

















The approach to Chief Commissioner of MACC in 2022



MACC Launches Operation Tropicana






The Strike – 21 FEB 2023





The Scripts



A treasure trove of scripts and documents on how to scam investors

LET ME ASK YOU A QUESTION.

HOW MUCH RESEARCH DID YOU DO, DID YOU DO PROPER RESEARCH, OR DID YOU HAVE A QUICK LOOK?

(IF ONLY QUICK LOOK - APPLY 'FRONTED NOT LOOKED' - IF HE SAYS HE DID THE RESEARCH CONTINUE)

SO, WHAT YOU ARE SAYING TO ME IS YOU RECEIVED MY E-MAIL, YOU DID SOME RESEARCH INTO WHO MY COMPANY IS, YOU OPENED UP THE LINKS IN THE E-MAIL WE SENT YOU, AND YOU LOOKED AT TIANQI LITHIUM? IS THAT WHAT YOU ARE TELLING ME (FN)?

(GET A RESPONSE)

(FN.) BEFORE YOU MAKE A DECISION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, I TOLD YOU LAST TIME WE SPOKE THAT WE WERE WAITING FOR SOME **EXTREMELY POSITIVE NEWS TO BE CONFIRMED...IT IS NOW IN, SO LET** ME GIVE YOU ALL OF THE FACTS BECAUSE YOU ARE ONLY WORKING WITH 75% OF THE INFORMATION ...

WHEN YOU'RE DOING YOUR RESEARCH, DID YOU SEE THAT THE PRICE HAD RISEN BY OVER 30% SINCE JANUARY THIS YEAR AND THAT WAS ON PURE SPECULATION, THAT VOLKSWAGEN AND TIANQI LITHIUM WOULD BE WORKING TOGETHER...

(FN.) IT'S NO LONGER RUMOUR; IT'S A FACT, AND WE NOW KNOW THAT VOLKSWAGEN ISN'T JUST WORKING WITH TIANQI LITHIUM. THEY HAVE HAD THEIR OFFER ACCEPTED, AND VOLKSWAGEN IS BUYING TIANQI LITHIUM FOR _____ HKD.

AS SOON AS THIS NEWS





LOOKED NOT INTERESTED

REALLY! I AM VERY, VERY SURPRISED TO HEAR YOU SAY THAT IS THE COMPLETELY THE OPPOSITE RESPONSE TO THE ONE I WAS

The Arrests












THE SEIZED ASSETS





The Seized Assets







The Fraud Mastermind

Andy Peters aka PegLeg

- 52-year-old **British citizen**
- Wanted by UK authorities
- Running Boiler rooms in SE Asia for **20 ye**ars
- Amassed significant wealth
- Closely connected to Organised Crime Groups in Thailand,
 Philippines, Russia and China
- **Pleaded guilty** and served **only 6 months** for one charge
- Back in business targeting Australians again since early 2024



The Result



- **81 arrests** of boiler room investment scammers
- 24 search warrants simultaneously served
- Equivalent to AUD 4.3 million in cash seized
- 54 bank accounts frozen
- 20 bank employees questioned
- **170 Officers involved** (No Malaysian Police involved)
- Caught in the act of setting up crypto scam office with 200 \bullet employees
- **Major disruption** to organised fraud against Australians

OPERATION TROPICANA Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Malaysia **21 February 2023**





Bank Number 1

- Failure to conduct Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) despite multiple high-risk indicators
- Accepted accounts using generic Gmail addresses instead of corporate domains
- No verification of legitimate business operations or physical site visits conducted
- Ignored clear **money laundering typologies**, including rapid personal deposits and withdrawals
- Relied on **unverified or duplicated documents** with questionable certifications
- Failed to escalate geographic risks related to offshore operations (Indonesia & **Philippines**)
- Account activity showed no linkage to declared clients or business services
- Inconsistent or **fabricated operational details**, including mismatched addresses
- No Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) were filed, despite overwhelming red flags
- Systemic breach of Malaysia's AMLA 2001 obligations and Bank Negara compliance standards







- Approved a "High Risk" corporate account without conducting Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD)
- Failed to independently verify residential or business addresses of directors or premises
- Allowed a foreign sole signatory (Chinese national) to control the account despite a local codirector
- Accepted **fabricated supporting documents**, including a suspicious payslip and business records
- No Tax Identification Number (TIN) was provided or followed up during onboarding
- Approved a USD \$1 million foreign exchange facility with no matching business justification
- Did not obtain prior personal or corporate banking history to validate financial legitimacy
- Overlooked use of a generic email address, contradicting corporate governance standards
- No site visits, no operational legitimacy checks, and no escalation to Financial Crime Risk • teams
- Breached Malaysia's AMLA 2001 and Bank Negara guidelines by enabling illicit fund movement







- Approved multiple high-risk corporate accounts without performing enhanced due diligence (EDD)
- Failed to verify beneficial ownership, director residency, or operational legitimacy for foreignincorporated entities
- Accepted falsified, incomplete, or unverifiable documentation, including fabricated contracts and missing TINs
- No site visits conducted and improper waivers used to bypass mandatory inspections
- Allowed use of generic email accounts and failed to question missing websites or corporate domains
- Repeated use of same address and introducers across multiple fraudulent entities was not escalated
- Permitted rapid in/out fund movements from personal names, inconsistent with declared business activity
- No Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) filed despite clear laundering typologies
- Same relationship managers onboarded multiple linked fraudulent entities without raising alerts
- Closed accounts quietly without investigation or documented rationale, violating AMLA and FATF standards



- Failed to verify director identity and residency under Labuan and Malaysian regulatory requirements
- Approved accounts without valid business license, operating agreement, or evidence of trading activity
- Accepted **generic email addresses** and lacked verification of digital or corporate presence
- No supporting documentation for financial claims, including unsubstantiated million-dollar revenue projections
- Allowed onboarding based on remote notarisation without confirming applicant presence in Malaysia
- Ignored adverse credit and regulatory red flags during background checks on directors
- No site visits conducted, and waivers were undocumented or unjustified in breach of internal policy
- Allowed layering transactions: rapid movement of funds from unrelated individuals without commercial link
- Failed to obtain and retain mandatory KYC documents, including passport and address proof
- **Closed accounts without filing Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs)** or providing reasons for closure











- Approved corporate account for high-risk entity without Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD)
- **Failed to verify declared business operations**, allowing fictitious crypto advisory claims
- Accepted **generic Gmail address** and unsupported business website as legitimate contact points
- No inspection of premises or validation of claimed business location in Kuala Lumpur
- Permitted a Chinese national to be sole operator of Malaysian company without confirming local substance
- No evidence of historical financial records or business activities at time of account approval
- Overlooked inconsistent director records and rapid corporate structure changes •
- Allowed rapid third-party deposits and withdrawals without questioning source or legitimacy
- Did not escalate or report blatant laundering typologies, contrary to AMLA and Bank Negara standards
- Relationship manager failed to question high-risk indicators, enabling fraudulent fund flows





"If this is what we uncovered... imagine what still lies hidden."

– Ken Gamble, IFW Global





GLOBAL

A leading global cybercrime investigation agency

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